AfD, the Shift in Germany’s Political Climate, and a War of Narratives
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Since Angela Merkel, Germany has presented a concerning political trajectory. Former Chancellor Angela Merkel is blamed for Germany’s energy dependency on Russia and a failure to reform the economy. Lindner, whose spectacular sacking precipitated this latest concerning developments, is accused of undermining the government.
The Greens are rounded upon for focusing on climate change over economic livelihoods. And the CDU is seen as opportunistic, while Friedrich Merz is regarded as abrasive. Well, then there has been the Alternative for Germany, or AfD. And in a world where pro-country sentiments and policies are a protruding trend, it has emerged as a notable contender with significant gains in the recent election, which we ought to discuss this further.
THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG ELECTIONS HELD ON FEBRUARY 23RD
You’d recall that late in the year 2024, German chancellor Olaf Scholz acted decisively in calling time on the coalition. Yet, even in this one act, he did not quite fully engage. Instead, he tried to buy time and delay the confidence vote to January, so the election would not take place until the end of March. And though he was eventually humbled on that front and forced to bring it forward by other parties, even the agreed date of February 23rd did not quite suggest the urgency required, especially by German society.
In any case, on February 23rd, the German Bundestag elections were held. The election took place seven months earlier than planned after Scholz’s unpopular coalition collapsed in November, three years into a term that was increasingly marred by infighting. There was also widespread discontent and not much enthusiasm for any of the candidates. The campaign was further dominated by concerns about the yearslong stagnation of Europe’s biggest economy and pressure to curb migration — something that caused friction after Merz pushed hard in recent weeks for a tougher approach. It also took place against a background of growing misalignment over the war in Ukraine and diversifying perspectives on Europe’s alliance with the United States.
Then, what emerged from the election results is that the opposition conservatives led by Friedrich Merz won a lackluster victory and Alternative for Germany doubled its support. In addition, Chancellor Olaf Scholz conceded defeat for his center-left Social Democrats after what he called “a bitter election result.” Following these results, Friedrich Merz said he hopes to put a coalition government together by Easter. But this is not without its challenges. However, here are some of the highlights following the legislative election results.
IS THE ALTERNATIVE FOR GERMANY (AFD) PARTY A THREAT TO GERMAN DEMOCRACY?
This brings us to a discussion on the Alternative for Germany (or AFD) party. So, AfD is right-wing and nativist political party in Germany, and nativist here meaning that it supports the policy of protecting the interests of native-born or established inhabitants against those of immigrants (but often illegal immigrants).The AfD is also Eurosceptic (which is to say that it oppose the EU). The name of the party reflects its resistance to (uncontested by mainstream parties) policies of Angela Merkel with her insistence on ’alternative-less-ness’, which is a German version of “there is no alternative”). AND, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Germany’s domestic intelligence agency, has classified the party as a “suspected extremist” organisation.
So, is AfD a threat to German democracy, and even an extremist organisation? Today, we will engage this in light of what the AfD is associated with; starting with its right wing and nativist ideology. Now, as far as whether the right wing and nativist ideology of the AfD makes it a threat to democracy or renders it an extremist organisation, my response is that there is nothing inherently wrong with right wing and nativist ideology. These ideologies are not well adjudicated through blanket assumptions of what they amount to; in fact, their applications tend to differ relative to the context in which they apply or are discussed. It’s the same thing with “conservatism”. Conservatism in the UK looks very different to how it manifests in the US – in the sense that conservatism in the UK often has very liberal applications. Similarly, not all positions taken by members of conservative, or right wing or nativist parties are inherently good or bad – it often depends on the context and what it is that they stand for relative to the best interests of their respective nations. For example, Nikki Haley ran as a member of the Republican Party, but she had very Democrat party inclined approaches to the Ukraine war, the military industrial complex and other issues.
Now, in the case of Germany, the AfD, being a right wing party perhaps fills a necessary gap. For some context, the more popular conservative party in Germany is the Christian Democratic Union of Germany (also known as the CDU). This is the party that is ahead of the AfD in the recent election, and it was the party of Angela Merkel, and now Friedrich Merz. The CDU is generally known as a conservative party, but in practical application, it is more of a centrist-right wing or centrist-conservative party. Furthermore, the party does not consistently prioritise Christian values; for example, in her 2005 campaign, Angela Merkel was unwilling to express explicitly Christian views while also maintaining that her party had never lost its concept of values. And this was notable because her avoiding the values issue may have had the opposite effect as she failed to mobilize the party’s core constituency at the time.
Therefore, when considering the German election against the backdrop of the increasing popularity of strict conservative or right wing parties (especially in application), it appears that the AfD has a similar appeal. Then on its nativist policies, I think the idea that the AfD supports the policy of protecting the interests of native-born or established inhabitants against those of immigrants quickly draws concern, considering Germany’s Nazi history. However, nativist ideals are not exclusive to Germany in Europe. In fact, in the status quo, they are often born out of legitimate concerns, over poorly crafted immigration policies and the great replacement agenda. In a number of European countries, immigrants, who often enter illegally, have now surpassed the population of natives. We’ve expressed previously why this is a concern: it is not so much that there are less caucasian people in European countries, rather it is that this is a diabolical tool by governments that enables them to curate the formation of a population that is more dependent, subservient and easier to control. Here’s Eva Vlaardingerbroek discussing the great replacement agenda, especially because the Netherlands had been reported as ground zero of this agenda.
Secondly, on whether the AfD is an extremist party, I think this is obviously relative to who makes the claim. For instance, Christians were labelled extremists as well, so much so the FBI pursued them as such under FBI Director Christopher Wray. And so, the term “extremism” or “extremist” is a highly politicised term. HOWEVER, what has been interesting to note is that the AfD’s support for absolute free speech has in part fueled the claim that it is an extremist organisation. Also interesting to note is that ultra-liberal individuals have been the ones to threaten violence (and even attempt it) against the AfD. We saw this, finstance, AfD leader Alice Weidel had her car and convoy attacked by the ultra-left.
IS THE AfD’s EUROSCEPTICISM A THREAT TO THE EUROPEAN UNION?
Then, finally, we ought to address whether the AfD’s Euroscepticism is a threat to the EU, and whether that is a bad thing. To start with, the AfD does (in fact) have eurosceptic views; but this is not news to anyone in Germany, the UK, Poland, Holland and a number of other European countries who hold similar concerns on the EU. But, secondly, I would like to put forward that perhaps euroscepticism has an ill-considered bad reputation: I say this because, at its best, euroscepticism represents a fundamental truth, which is that if an alliance does not serve the best interests of a country, nations should have the sovereign entitlement to question the necessity of siad alliance, and even leave the alliance altogether, should it be the will of the people.
Secondly, as far as the substantive reasons for euroscepticism in Germany or from the AfD is concerned, the obligation of a government is to its people first, or – in this case – the obligation of a multi-state entity should be to its member states first. However, the EU has a constant challenge where it undermines unilateral government decisions and preferences because of its modus operandi of blanket policies. You’d recall that among the arguments from the ‘leave’ campaign in the Brexit debate was that EU immigration laws undermined Britain’s sovereignty to regulate immigration to an intolerable extent, and the EU refused to budge on issues such as immigration, citing its commitment to freedom of movement. Similarly, we saw similar concerns when the EU was forcing Ukrainian grain on EU farmers, while Ukraine was not even a member state. Therefore, the EU is the reason for euroscepticism, the AfD is merely a party that echoes remarks that already exist. In fact, euroscepticism has been a problem for decades now!
Well, looking at its approach to the Ukraine proxy war and grain deal, the EU never quite aspired to more federalism, hence increases in euroscepticism.
AGAIN, THE “FAR-RIGHT PARTIES” ARE NOT FAR RIGHT AT ALL
This brings us to a discussion on the war on narratives. I am absolutely certain that in most news coverage pertaining to the AfD, you have not only heard that they are a right wing party, but specifically that they are a “far right” party. Now, this is a continuation of the weaponisation of language we’ve previously discussed. But (in essence), while you will always find pockets of far-right thinking in Europe’s political system, the notion that new and emerging political parties on the right are generally “far-right” is simply false. We’ve discussed, for example, that if you go to the webpage of one of the major emerging political groups that is supposed to be part of the “far-right surge,” the European Conservatives and Reformists, you are greeted not by neo-Nazi slogans, but by commitments to “safeguarding citizens and borders,” “respecting the rights and sovereignty of member States,” “protecting the global environment at a cost we can afford,” and “improving the union’s efficiency and effectiveness”.
If you also peruse the website of the Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia), the political party associated with the supposedly “far-right” Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, in search of reactionary and extremist ideas, you will be deeply disappointed. The website displays a fairly humdrum list of policies to promote economic growth, a safer Europe, a better health system, policies to support families and boost the birth rate, opposition to bio-surveillance (“green pass”), and the need to combat illegal immigration.
It’s the same with European Conservatives and Reformists; when listening to Professor Ryszard Legutko’s remarks from from the time he was leading the European Conservatives and Reformists, he lambasted the EU legislature for what he called “shameless partisanship” – essentially offering a criticism of the left and liberal agenda BUT not simultaneously advocating for lawlessness and institutional destruction – as far-right entities are often associated with.
THE “FAR-RIGHT LABEL” IS A POLARISATION TACTIC
And based on the very ideas that some of the so-called right parties stand for, we might infer that anyone who describes these sorts of policies as “far-right” is simply determined to discredit their political adversaries by any means available. And yet this sort of lazy, dishonest, and demonising treatment of the new right in Europe, which mostly ignores the actual electoral platforms of new-right parties, is now standard fare in mainstream Western media.
Which brings us to the discussion on why the “far right” label is still being used as a polarisation tactic. The term “far-right” should be reserved for political groups that oppose constitutionalism, are rabidly racist, or want to institute an authoritarian State akin to fascist Italy or Nazi Germany. However, the term has degenerated into a cheap label used to discredit political conservatives. Liberals are incredibly aware of the powerful messaging that comes with comparing conservatives to figures, parties or policies that were notorious for human rights violations and crimes against humanity in the past. This comparison tends to immediately invoke fear and distrust to a great extent – not because the conservative parties warranted it, but because of how bad the figures or parties they are being compared to are. This comparison basically casts a cloud of suspicion and distrust on conservative parties despite what they actually stand for. An example of this is the fear mongering that launched the protests in cities across France against what is claimed to be the” far-right National Rally” ahead of upcoming elections to the French parliament. These protests occurred on the guise of protecting democracy against so-called far-right Nazi’s, and not on the factual consideration of what the right wing parties stand for – and importantly, why that which these right wing parties stand for has even resulted in liberal parties losing votes (especially when looking at France).
Secondly, this means that conservative parties have to perform double the work when campaigning. They not only have to prove why they ought to be the party of choice against their present rivals – but it also means they have to undo the association with the Hitler-esque figures and parties in order to prevent being immediately dismissed by voters. And the proof of this, are the protests that erupted shortly after Macron announced the election date following his embarrassing defeat earlier this month. Some french citizens took to the streets to protest what is apparently a “dark cloud” of far-right parties winning in the European Parliament elections – when really all the victory of the parties represents in a demand for better and conservative leadership in the wake of the inclinations of the European Parliament, which have led to devastated economies (especially tied to the Ukraine proxy war or subsidised grain), totalitarian responses to dissent, and poor immigration laws.
But, ultimately, this label is being attached willy-nilly to people who take political positions that are not in concert with those who self-identify as “Woke” and/or “progressive.” Furthermore, people are labelled “far-right” if they defend the idea of a national identity, want an orderly immigration process, advocate for laws that are tough on crime, believe in traditional marriage or believe that civil rights like informed consent are still relevant during a pandemic. However, the world had in fact began being polarised, especially with respect to inclination of the proxy between Russia and Ukraine, and clearly, the European Parliament elections are impacted by this because people do not want their governments spending more on a war that does not fundamentally have anything to do with Ukraine, while possible getting them into a war with Russia.
WHAT IS CAUSING THE GROWTH OF RIGHT WING PARTIES IN EUROPE?
We also ought to discuss why new parties (like the AfD) have been emerging on the right. What is really happening is that, first, the traditional right-wing parties, many of which are represented by Europe’s largest political group, the European People’s Party, have abandoned a lot of traditional right-wing commitments, creating a vacuum to be filled by the “new right.” For example, rule of law and limited government have been replaced, under the watch of traditional “right-wing” parties, with vaccine passports, lockdowns, intrusive hate speech laws, crippling “green” taxes and regulations, and the Orwellian idea that we should clamp down on “disinformation,” lest citizens be exposed to “dangerous” ideas. And this has created a pent-up political demand for parties prepared to avow traditional right-wing commitments, such as law and order, orderly immigration, freedom of speech, pro-family taxation and welfare policies, and limited government.
And while in some cases, this political vacuum has been filled with egregiously xenophobic, racist, and authoritarian rhetoric; in many other cases, parties dismissed as “far-right” are simply questioning the wisdom of open border policies, exposing abuses of the refugee system, defending free speech, and trying to show how oppressive the green agenda is for farmers and citizens.
The second cause of the growth of right wing parties in Europe is that they speak in concert with the interests and demands of European voters. For instance, a recent opinion poll shows that immigration is one of the leading concerns for European voters, after the economy and war. In addition, the abysmal performance of the Greens in these EU elections—dropping from 71 to 53 seats—suggests that the Greens’ enthusiasm for ambitious climate regulations is not shared by many voters. For instance, Viktor Orbán’s popularity is tied to his openly promulgated opposition to liberal policies, and even deep state figures like Gerorge Soros.
Written By Lindokuhle Mabaso